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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RECORDATION AS NOTICE OF BUILDING
RESTRICTIONS
The case of Finley v. Glenn," recently decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, clarifies the law as to the
effect of recordation as notice of building restrictions. In
this case an owner of certain lots conveyed several of them
by a deed containing building restrictions, covenanting
that he would impose the same restrictions in deeds for the
remaining lots, and this deed was recorded. Subsequently
he conveyed the remaining lots without such building
restrictions being contained in the deed. The defendants
started to erect a building on their land which clearly
violated the covenant contained in the plaintiff's deed, but
not contained in that of the defendants. The plaintiff filed
a bill for an injunction in equity to restrain violation of the
building restriction. The court, per Schaffer, J., held that
the later grantee (defendant) was bound by the terms of
the deed to the former grantee (plaintiff) although he had
no actual notice of such terms. In reaching this conclusion
the learned Justice stated:
"The controlling factor in the decision of the case
is that the immediate grantors of both plaintiff
and defendants were the same. When the latter came
to examine the title which was tendered to them, it was
of primary consequence that they should know whether
their grantors held title to the land which they were
to convey. They could determine that question only
by searching for grants from them. 'The rule has always
been that the grantee ... must search for conveyances
. . . made by anyone who has held the title': Pyles v.
Brown, 189 Pa. 164, 168. 'The weight of authority is
to the effect that if a deed or a contract for the con-
veyance of one parcel of land with a covenant or ease-
ment affecting another parcel of land owned by the
same grantor, is duly recorded, the record is con-
structive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
latter parcel. The ruie is based generally upon the
principle that a grantee is chargeable with notice of
everything affecting his title which could be dis-
covered by an examination of the records of the deeds
1303 Pa. 131, 154 AtL 299 (1931).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
or other muniments of title of his grantor:' 16 Amer.
Law Rep. 1013, and cases cited; 2 Tiffany's Real
Property, 1920 edition, p. 2188. So doing defendants
would find the deed from Rosekrans and his wife (the
common grantors) to plaintiff which had been re-
corded. Coming upon this conveyance, it was their
duty to read it, not, as argued appellant and decided
by the chancellor who heard the case, to read only the
description of the property to see what was conveyed,
but to read the deed in its entirety, to note anything
else which might be set forth in it. The deed was
notice to them of all it contained; otherwise the pur-
pose of the recording acts would be frustrated. If
they had read all of it, they would have discovered
that the lots which their vendors were about to con-
vey to them had been subjected to the building re-
striction which the deed disclosed. It boots nothing,
so far as notice is concerned, that they did not acquaint
themselves with the entire contents of the deed. It
affected them to the same extent as if they had read
it all. This is the rule of all our cases and the ex-
pressed declaration of the Recording Act."1
2
The appellant relied upon the case of O'Neil v. Lex,8
decided in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County per Gordon, Jr., J., wherein the learned Judge
reached a contrary conclusion. The facts in this case were
the following: a man owned a piece of land in the City of
Philadelphia, a part of which he sold and covenanted in the
deed which was duly recorded that the remainder of the
land should be restricted for residences only which were to
be similar to those built by the prior grantee. The com-
mon grantor did not insert the building restriction in the
deed to the second grantee. The second grantee con-
tracted to sell the land to the plaintiff, whereupon the prior
grantee notified the plaintiff of the building restriction.
This proceeding was then brought by the plaintiff to have
his rights and duties declared in the event he settled with
the defendant (second grantee).
The court raised the question whether the recording
of the deed by the first grantee charged subsequent
bid. pp. 135, 136.
89 Pa. D. & C. 149.
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grantees and those claiming under or through them with
notice of the building restriction placed in the first
grantee's deed by the common grantor. The court
answered this question in the negative basing its conclu-
sion largely on the fact that the deed containing the build-
ing restriction was not in the direct line of the plaintiff's
title. All that was necessary said the court, was that the
second grantee search the deed from the common grantor
to the first grantee in order to establish what piece of
land had been conveyed, and upon discovering that it was
not that portion of land which he contemplated buying, he
was under no duty to read further. The reason given by
the court for the rule was the following:
"It would place an intolerable burden upon a pur-
chaser to require him to. search every deed of all his
predecessors in title, whether or not it related to the
land being bought, in order to be sure that no inci-
dental and collateral agreement was contained in them.
It would lead to dangerous consequences and would
defeat the principal purpose of the recording acts-
the promotion of certainty and ease in the conveying
of property."'
Virginia, Texas and Georgia have enunciated the doc-
trine set forth by the above lower court.5 However, since
the Finley Case has been decided, the decision of that lower
court can no longer be said to be the law in Pennsylvania.
It is submitted that, although the conclusion reached
by the Supreme Court in the Finley Case is in accord with
the spirit of the recording acts, yet it undoubtedly in-
creases the burden upon all of those who are engaged in
the searching of titles. Instead of merely reading the de-
scription in all deeds of a common grantor, one must now
read these deeds in their entirety.
W. GERALD DANAHEY.
dIbid. p. 150.
5Providence Forge Fishing Club v. Gill, 117 Va. 557, 85 S. E. 464
(1915); Thompson v. Cole, 126 S. W. 923 (Texas-1910); Hancock v.
Gumm, 107 S. E. 872 (Ga.-1921).
